ABSTRACT

Truth-conditions are systematically determined when they are the output of an algorithmic procedure that takes as input a set of semantic and (optionally) contextual features. Truth-conditional sceptics have cast doubts on the thesis that truth-conditions are systematic in this sense. Against this form of scepticism, Schoubye and Stokke ([2016]. “What is said?” Noûs 50 (4): 759–793) and Dobler ([2019]. “Occasion-sensitive semantics for objective predicates.” Linguistics and Philosophy 42 (5): 451–474.) have provided systematic analyses of utterance truth-conditions. My aim is to argue that these theories are not immune to the kind of objections raised by truth-conditional sceptics. In particular, I argue that the use of Questions Under Discussion (Schoubye and Stokke) and ways of being (Dobler) is problematic.

摘要

当真值条件是算法过程的输出时，它们会被系统地确定，该算法过程将一组语义和（可选）上下文特征作为输入。真值条件怀疑论者对真值条件在这个意义上是系统的这一命题提出了质疑。反对这种形式的怀疑论，Schoubye 和 Stokke ([2016]. “What is said?” Noûs 50 (4): 759–793) and Dobler ([2019]. “Occasion-sensitive semantics for objective predicates.” Linguistics and Philosophy42 (5): 451–474.) 提供了对话语真实条件的系统分析。我的目的是争辩说，这些理论不能免于真理条件怀疑论者提出的那种反对意见。特别是，我认为使用正在讨论的问题（Schoubye 和 Stokke）和存在方式（Dobler）是有问题的。