ABSTRACT

This paper argues that Nietzsche shares the aim of contemporary Sellarsian efforts to reconcile the natural and the normative. However, as Joseph Rouse notes, the Sellarsian strategy collapses into dualism by virtue of its treatment of natural causality and normativity as different in kind and of the normative as operating parallel to the causal (Rouse 2002 Rouse, J. 2002. How Scientific Practices Matter. Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press. [Google Scholar]). The paper argues that Nietzsche avoids this dualism by offering a constitutively causal account of the normative. He does this by identifying the normative with dominant drives of the self. It is argued that these dominant drives, like natural causes in the world, are modally dispositional and differ from natural causes in degree rather than dualistically in kind. However, the identification of the normative status of our values with dominant drives has been subject to strenuous criticism. Specifically, it is argued that the normative cannot be identified with dominant drives for fear of eliminating the normative. The paper responds to these criticisms in detail and argues that the constitutively causal account of normativity that stems from Nietzsche’s identification of the normative with dominant drives can be defended.

摘要

本文认为，尼采与当代塞勒斯努力调和自然与规范的目标是一致的。然而，正如约瑟夫·劳斯 (Joseph Rouse) 所指出的那样，由于将自然因果关系和规范性处理为不同种类的自然因果关系以及与因果关系平行运行的规范性，塞勒斯主义策略崩溃为二元论（Rouse 2002 劳斯，J. 2002 年。科学实践如何重要。芝加哥 IL：芝加哥大学出版社。 [谷歌学术]）。该论文认为，尼采通过提供规范的构成性因果解释来避免这种二元论。他通过将规范与自我的主导驱动相结合来做到这一点。有人认为，这些占主导地位的驱动力，就像世界上的自然原因一样，是模态倾向的，在程度上不同于自然原因，而不是在种类上是二元的。然而，将我们的价值观的规范地位与主导驱动力相结合受到了强烈的批评。具体而言，有人认为，由于害怕消除规范，不能将规范与主导驱动力等同起来。这篇论文详细回应了这些批评，并认为源于尼采对规范性与主导驱动力的认同的规范性的构成性因果解释可以得到辩护。