The background of this paper (section 1) consists in a new account to foundation-theoretic epistemology characterized by two features: (i) All beliefs are to be justified by deductive, inductive or abductive inferences from a minimalistic class of unproblematic (introspective or analytic) basic beliefs. (ii) Higher-order justifications for these inferences are given by means of the novel method of optimality justifications. Optimality justifications are a new tool for epistemology (section 2). An optimality justification does not attempt to demonstrate that a cognitive method is reliable (which is impossible), but pursues the more modest goal of demonstrating that the method is optimal among all accessible alternative methods for the given epistemic goal. The reasoning from the established optimality of a method to the acceptability of a particular belief generated by the method is accomplished by so-called optimality principles. In sections 3–5, the method of optimality justifications is carried out in detail for three fundamental problems: justifying induction, logic, and theory-generating abduction.

中文翻译：

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最优性理由和最优性原则：基础理论认识论的新工具

本文的背景（第 1 节）包括对基础理论认识论的新解释，其特征在于两个特征：(i) 所有信念都应通过演绎、归纳或溯因推论来证明，这些推论来自无问题的（内省或分析的）极简主义类别) 基本信念。(ii) 这些推论的高阶证明是通过最优性证明的新方法给出的。最优性理由是认识论的新工具（第 2 节）。最优性证明并不试图证明认知方法是可靠的（这是不可能的），而是追求更适度的目标，即证明该方法是最优的在给定认知目标的所有可用替代方法中。从一种方法的既定最优性到该方法产生的特定信念的可接受性的推理是通过所谓的最优性原则完成的。在第 3-5 节中，最优性证明方法针对三个基本问题进行了详细说明：证明归纳、逻辑和理论生成溯因。