Bernard Harcourt's latest book is bold, brave, and too short.

It is bold in its ambition to return critical theory to praxis, to action, to changing the world instead of interpreting it. Harcourt urges critical theorists to stop infighting over epistemological issues and focus on what is important—for the world needs changing, as he makes abundantly clear.

The book is brave because it does precisely what Harcourt argues critical theory should do: It sketches critical theory's history in the 20th century in order to offer a way forward. According to Harcourt's diagnosis, critical theory has gradually separated itself from critical praxis because it embarked on an “epistemological detour” (Harcourt, 2020, p. 4, see chapter 1–5; henceforth CP). In order to guide critical theory back to the main road, towards praxis, three steps must be taken, Harcourt claims: First, critical theory must learn the lesson of the “epistemological detour” and develop a “radical philosophy of illusions” (CP 46, see chapters 6 and 7). This radical philosophy of illusion defends a defetishizing critique as an endless process of unmasking, knowing full well that each time it unveils something to be something else, this something else eventually will be unmasked, too. No truths are offered because truth is only a pretence of solid foundations to better hide the exercise of power (see CP 184–190).

In order not to get lost in the infinite series of denunciations of illusions, critical theory needs, second, a “radical critical theory of values” (CP 48, see chapters 8–10) that includes an extended discussion of the problem of violence. Whereas the radical philosophy of values—Harcourt repeatedly names “equality, solidarity, social justice and autonomy” (e.g. CP 1, 46 f., 164, 230) and sometimes adds “compassion” and “respect” for good measure (e.g. CP 16, 265, 280)¹—serves to orient the endless defetishizing critique, the discussion of violence is necessary because critical theory affirms a horizon of “endless struggles” (CP chapters 11–13).

By this point, we are only halfway through the book, and the third step, which is also the most important for Harcourt, is yet to come: Critical theory must be reconnected to praxis via a “radical critical theory of strategies and tactics” (CP 48, see chapters 14–16). This involves a historical sketch of how critical practices have changed during the 20th century and a dazzling tour de force through contemporary forms of critical practices. The upshot, according to Harcourt, is that the “radical critical philosophy of strategies and tactics” should no longer ask Lenin's question “What is to be done?” but the humbler question “What more am I to do?” (CP 438 f.)

Again, Harcourt does what he argues for. Adhering to his individualized version of the “praxis imperative” (CP 438 f.), he reflects on his own critical theory and praxis as well as its development in the last decades in a deeply personal account that takes up the last 100 pages (CP chapters 17–19). Calling the book brave thus is twice justified: On the one hand, the sheer scope of Harcourt's reconstructed critical theory and its critical praxis is breath-takingly ambitious. On the other hand, it is courageous to implicate oneself in the way Harcourt does in giving an account of his own efforts in the last part of the book.

However, the book is too short to argue in detail for what it tries to accomplish—and too long for a comprehensive review. Given the gargantuan mass of issues worth engaging with, I will be utterly selective in addressing just two. I will do so in the spirit of Harcourt's last line of his conclusion, namely by taking up his invitation to “continue the conversation, confrontation, and endless struggles” (CP 536). For I will argue that there are serious flaws in the book's two guiding ideas that have grave consequences for critical theory and praxis: Harcourt is wrong to blame an “epistemological detour” for critical theory's separation from praxis (1). And he draws the wrong lesson from the “epistemological detour” by arguing that the critical praxis imperative must be individualized to the point of solipsism (2). Both mistakes stem from Harcourt's tendency to amass material without taking the time to work it through argumentatively.

伯纳德·哈考特 (Bernard Harcourt) 的最新著作大胆、勇敢，但篇幅太短。

它的雄心壮志是让批判理论回归实践、行动、改变世界而不是解释世界。Harcourt 敦促批判理论家停止在认识论问题上的内讧，并专注于重要的事情——因为世界需要改变，正如他非常清楚的那样。

这本书很勇敢，因为它正是哈考特认为批判理论应该做的：它勾勒了 20 世纪批判理论的历史，以提供前进的道路。根据哈考特的诊断，批判理论由于走上了“认识论的弯路”而逐渐脱离了批判实践（Harcourt，  2020，第 4，见第1-5章；从今以后CP）。为了引导批判理论回到主路，走向实践，必须采取三个步骤，哈考特声称：第一，批判理论必须吸取“认识论弯路”的教训，发展“激进的幻觉哲学”（CP 46 ，见第 6 章和第 7 章）。这种激进的幻觉哲学将去拜物教的批判辩护为一个无休止的揭开面具的过程，他清楚地知道，每次它揭开某物的面纱时，它最终也会被揭开。没有提供任何真相，因为真相只是为了更好地隐藏权力的行使而伪装的坚实基础（见 CP 184-190）。

为了不迷失在对幻觉的无限谴责中，批判理论需要第二个“激进的批判价值理论”（CP 48，见第 8-10 章），其中包括对暴力问题的扩展讨论。而激进的价值观——Harcourt 反复提到“平等、团结、社会正义和自治”（例如 CP 1, 46 f., 164, 230），有时还会添加“同情”和“尊重”以获得良好的衡量标准（例如 CP 16 , 265, 280) ¹ — 用于引导无休止的去拜物教批判，对暴力的讨论是必要的，因为批判理论肯定了“无休止的斗争”的视野（CP 第 11-13 章）。

到这里，我们才读完这本书的一半，对哈考特来说也是最重要的第三步还没有到来：必须通过“战略和战术的激进批判理论”将批判理论与实践重新联系起来（ CP 48，见第 14-16 章）。这涉及对 20 世纪批判实践如何变化的历史概述，以及通过当代形式的批判实践令人眼花缭乱的杰作。根据哈考特的说法，结果是“战略和战术的激进批判哲学”不应该再问列宁的问题“要做什么？” 但更谦虚的问题是“我还能做什么？” (CP 438 f.)

再一次，哈考特做了他所主张的。坚持他的个性化版本的“实践命令”（CP 438 f.），他在最后 100 页的深度个人叙述中反思了自己的批判理论和实践及其在过去几十年中的发展（CP第 17-19 章）。将这本书称为勇敢的书有两次理由：一方面，哈考特重建的批判理论及其批判实践的绝对范围是令人叹为观止的雄心勃勃。另一方面，哈考特在本书的最后部分描述自己的努力时，用这种方式来暗示自己是勇敢的。

然而，这本书太短，无法详细讨论它试图实现的目标——而且太长，无法进行全面审查。鉴于值得参与的大量问题，我将完全有选择性地只解决两个问题。我将本着哈考特结论的最后一行的精神这样做，即接受他的邀请，“继续对话、对抗和无休止的斗争”（CP 536）。因为我将争辩说，这本书的两个指导思想存在严重缺陷，对批判理论和实践产生严重后果：哈考特将批判理论与实践的分离归咎于“认识论绕道”是错误的（1）。他从“认识论的迂回”中吸取了错误的教训，认为批判实践的命令必须个体化到唯我论的程度（2）。