We study solution concepts for nontransferable utility games according to which the coalition structure and the payoff allocations are simultaneously determined. The steady bargaining set is a refinement of the Zhou bargaining set, which is included in the Mas-Colell bargaining set. We prove the nonemptiness and partial efficiency of the steady bargaining set for at least one coalition structure under the restrictive non-crossing condition. Without this condition, the Zhou bargaining set may be empty and the Mas-Colell bargaining set is nonempty but may not be efficient.

中文翻译：

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谈判集和联盟形成

我们研究了不可转让效用博弈的解决方案概念，根据该概念，联盟结构和收益分配同时被确定。稳定讨价还价集是周讨价还价集的改进版，包含在马斯-科莱尔讨价还价集中。我们证明了在限制性不交叉条件下至少一个联盟结构的稳定讨价还价集的非空性和部分效率。如果没有这个条件，Zhou 讨价还价集可能是空的，而 Mas-Colell 讨价还价集是非空的但可能没有效率。