The distinction between true belief and knowledge is one of the most fundamental in philosophy, and a remarkable effort has been dedicated to formulating the conditions on which true belief constitutes knowledge. For decades, much of this epistemological undertaking has been dominated by a single strategy, referred to here as the modal approach. Shared by many of the most widely influential constraints on knowledge, including the sensitivity, safety, and anti-luck/risk conditions, this approach rests on a key underlying assumption — the modal profiles available to known and unknown beliefs are in some way asymmetrical. The first aim of this paper is to deconstruct this assumption, identifying its plausibility with the way in which epistemologists frequently conceptualize human perceptual systems as excluding certain varieties of close error under conditions conducive to knowledge acquisition. The second aim of this paper is to then argue that a neural phase phenomenon indicates that this conceptualization is quite likely mistaken. This argument builds on the previous introduction of this neural phase to the context of epistemology, expanding the use of neural phase cases beyond relatively narrow questions about epistemic luck to a much more expansive critique of the modal approach as a whole.

中文翻译：

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接近错误、视觉感知和神经阶段：对知识模态方法的批判

真信念和知识之间的区别是哲学中最基本的区别之一，并且已经做出了非凡的努力来制定真信念构成知识的条件。几十年来，这种认识论的大部分工作都被一个单一的策略所支配，这里称为模态方法. 许多影响最广泛的知识约束共享，包括敏感性、安全性和反运气/风险条件，这种方法基于一个关键的基本假设——已知和未知信念可用的模态配置文件在某种程度上是不对称的。本文的第一个目的是解构这个假设，通过认识论者经常将人类感知系统概念化为在有利于知识获取的条件下排除某些类型的密切错误的方式来确定其合理性。本文的第二个目的是论证神经相位现象表明这种概念化很可能是错误的。这个论点建立在之前将这个神经阶段引入认识论背景的基础上，