We offer the first systematic inquiry into the role of caseload for efficacy of judicial enforcement, a critical but underexplored stage of the judicial process. We first develop a stylized model that elucidates the interrelated nature of judicial effort choice in enforcement versus adjudication. We then examine the model's prediction using data from labor courts in Brazil, where inefficacious judicial enforcement has been an enduring policy concern. Judicial efficacy at disposing enforcement cases is, as hypothesized, positively associated with both pending and newly filed enforcement cases, but, notably, negatively associated with pending adjudication cases. Thus, judges perceive the tasks of enforcement and adjudication as substitutes, not complements. We clarify the policy significance of this finding. More generally, our analysis demonstrates that assessment of judicial efficacy in one specific domain necessitates careful consideration of judicial caseload in all domains.

我们对案件量对司法执行效率的作用进行了首次系统调查，这是司法程序的一个关键但未充分探索的阶段。我们首先开发了一个程式化的模型，阐明了执法与裁决中司法努力选择的相互关联性质。然后，我们使用巴西劳动法院的数据检查模型的预测，在那里，无效的司法执行一直是一个持久的政策问题。处理执法案件的司法效力，正如假设的那样，与未决和新提交的执法案件呈正相关，但值得注意的是，与未决裁决案件呈负相关。因此，法官将执行和裁决的任务视为替代，而不是补充。我们阐明了这一发现的政策意义。更普遍，