This study contributes to the literature by exploring the relationship between board financial expertise and cash holding policy and further showing how this relation is moderated by multiple large shareholders (MLS). This research is based on agency theory, resource dependence, trade-off, and pecking order theory to confirm how resourceful directors screen cash holding practices. This study selects the 100 listed family firms from the emerging economy of Pakistan for the period of 2006–2017. With the use of static (random and fixed effect estimator) and dynamic (GMM) estimation techniques, this study reveals that the financial expertise of the board members has a significant negative impact on the firms’ cash holding level. Further, moderating effect of MLS between board financial expertise and cash holding is significantly positive due to weak corporate governance mechanisms in family firms. Moreover, the research has implications for developing corporate governance mechanism and the management of liquid assets that corporate management might use for their benefits.

中文翻译：

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董事会财务专业知识和公司现金持有：多个大股东在新兴家族企业中的调节作用

本研究通过探讨董事会财务专业知识与现金持有政策之间的关系，并进一步展示这种关系如何受到多个大股东 (MLS) 的调节，从而为文献做出了贡献。本研究基于代理理论、资源依赖、权衡和啄食顺序理论，以确认足智多谋的董事如何筛选现金持有实践。本研究选择了 2006-2017 年期间巴基斯坦新兴经济体的 100 家上市家族企业。通过使用静态（随机和固定效应估计量）和动态（GMM）估计技术，本研究表明董事会成员的财务专业知识对公司的现金持有水平有显着的负面影响。更多，由于家族企业的公司治理机制薄弱，MLS 在董事会财务专业知识和现金持有之间的调节作用显着为正。此外，该研究对发展公司治理机制和管理公司管理层可能为他们谋取利益的流动资产有影响。