Abstract

This article reconsiders the 1960 coup in Turkey, paying particular attention to the interactions and power relations in play, both within the army and between the army and civilians. I argue that the 1960 coup, rather than being an example of the military resolving a political crisis, is better understood as the army exploiting a social context which lent itself to portraying the use of force against the government and its allies as legitimate. First, I show that the 27 May coup consisted in dissident officers exploiting a context to push through sector-specific demands. Second, I depict the instability constituting the period of military administration and the following months. This enables me to show how the general staff, drawing on the support of civilian political actors, managed to re-establish the army’s hierarchy and stabilize its internal power relations. Finally, I analyze how the military institution managed to impose its authority over civilians during the years following the 1960 intervention, thanks to the judicial, economic, and institutional autonomy it acquired as of this first coup

摘要

本文重新考虑了 1960 年土耳其的政变，特别关注军队内部以及军队与平民之间的相互作用和权力关系。我认为 1960 年的政变与其说是军队解决政治危机的一个例子，不如说是军队利用了一种社会背景，这种社会背景有助于将针对政府及其盟友使用武力描绘成合法的行为。首先，我表明 5 月 27 日的政变包括持不同政见的官员利用背景来推动特定部门的要求。其次，我描绘了构成军事管理时期和随后几个月的不稳定。这使我能够展示总参谋部如何在民间政治行动者的支持下，重新建立军队的等级制度并稳定其内部权力关系。最后，我分析了军事机构如何在 1960 年干预之后的几年里设法将其权力强加给平民，这要归功于它在第一次政变时获得的司法、经济和机构自主权