We study exclusive dealing when the incumbent may be displaced by a more efficient entrant due to the need for a firm to pay a fixed cost to remain active. We show that the incumbent can deter socially efficient entry through exclusive contracts under the one-buyer-one-supplier framework. This result continues to hold in the presence of product differentiation, in which case exclusion is more likely to occur when the efficiency gap between the entrant and the incumbent falls into an intermediate range.

中文翻译：

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上游置换可能时的独家交易

由于公司需要支付固定成本以保持活跃，当现有企业可能被更有效率的进入者取代时，我们研究了排他性交易。我们表明，在一个买家-一个供应商框架下，现任者可以通过排他性合同阻止社会有效进入。在存在产品差异化的情况下，这一结果继续成立，在这种情况下，当进入者和在位者之间的效率差距落入中间范围时，更有可能发生排斥。