We develop a search and matching model where jobs can be formal or informal. Workers choose schooling and search for jobs. Firms post vacancies in each schooling market and decide the job's formality status. Upon meeting, workers and firms bargain over wages. The equilibrium size of the informal sector is an endogenous function of labor market fundamentals and institutions. We estimate the model using labor force survey data from Mexico and exploiting the exogenous variation induced by a noncontributory social program. Counterfactual experiments show that eliminating informal jobs increases schooling investments but decreases welfare for both workers and firms.

中文翻译：

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劳动力市场搜索、非正规性和学校投资

我们开发了一个搜索和匹配模型，其中的工作可以是正式的或非正式的。工人选择上学和寻找工作。公司在每个教育市场发布职位空缺并决定职位的形式状态。开会时，工人和公司就工资讨价还价。非正规部门的均衡规模是劳动力市场基本面和制度的内生函数。我们使用来自墨西哥的劳动力调查数据并利用非缴费型社会计划引起的外生变化来估计该模型。反事实实验表明，消除非正规工作会增加学校教育投资，但会降低工人和公司的福利。