The concept of causal specificity is drawing considerable attention from philosophers of biology. It became the rationale for rejecting (and occasionally, accepting) a thesis of causal parity of developmental factors. This literature assumes that attributing specificity to causal relations is at least in principle a straightforward (if not systematic) task. However, the parity debate in philosophy of biology seems to be stuck at a point where it is not the biological details that will help move forward. In this paper, I take a step back to reexamine the very idea of causal specificity and its intended role in the parity dispute in philosophy of biology. I contend that the idea of causal specificity across variations as currently discussed in the literature is irreducibly twofold in nature: it is about two independent components that are not mutually entailed. I show this to be the source of prior complications with the notion of specificity itself that ultimately affect the purposes for which it is often invoked, notably to settle the parity dispute.

因果特异性的概念引起了生物学哲学家的极大关注。它成为拒绝（偶尔接受）发展因素因果平等论点的理由。该文献假设将特异性归因于因果关系至少在原则上是一项简单的（如果不是系统的）任务。然而，生物学哲学中的平等辩论似乎停留在一个点，即不是生物学细节有助于向前发展。在本文中，我后退一步重新审视因果特异性的概念及其在生物学哲学中的均等争论中的预期作用。我认为，目前在文献中讨论的跨变体的因果特异性的想法在本质上是不可简化的：它是关于两个不相互关联的独立组成部分。我表明这是特定性概念本身的先前复杂化的根源，最终影响了它经常被调用的目的，特别是解决平价争议。