We conduct an experiment on gender differences in bargaining with asymmetric information. Based on Abreu and Gul (2000), we introduce asymmetric information about commitments by inducing irrational types, who never back down from a fixed bargaining position. Bargaining behavior depends on whether gender is revealed or not. When gender is unknown, men are more likely to mimic irrational types than women, but this gender gap is eliminated when gender is known. Male-male pairs also experience longer delays than other pairs, but only when gender is revealed and only in pairs where one subject mimics the irrational type.

中文翻译：

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信息不对称谈判中的性别差异

我们对信息不对称讨价还价中的性别差异进行了实验。基于 Abreu 和 Gul（2000），我们通过诱导非理性类型来引入关于承诺的不对称信息，他们从不从固定的谈判立场上退缩。讨价还价行为取决于是否透露性别。当性别未知时，男性比女性更容易模仿非理性类型，但当性别已知时，这种性别差距就被消除了。男性-男性配对也比其他配对经历更长的延迟，但只有在性别被揭示时，并且只有在一个对象模仿非理性类型的配对中。