We study the second-price auctions without and with default, where bidders are assumed to be risk averse and have uncertain valuations. We show that without default both the equilibrium bid and the seller's expected revenue decrease with risk aversion, and with default the equilibrium bid still decreases but the seller's expected revenue may decrease or increase as risk aversion increases. These results imply that without default the seller prefers risk-neutral bidders to risk-averse bidders, but with default the seller's preference is ambiguous, which contrast with the well-known results obtained in auctions with certain valuations.

中文翻译：

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风险规避在无违约和有违约的拍卖中的影响

我们研究了没有违约和有违约的二次价格拍卖，其中投标人被认为是风险厌恶的并且估值不确定。我们表明，在没有违约的情况下，均衡出价和卖方的预期收入都会随着风险厌恶的增加而降低，而在违约的情况下，均衡出价仍然会降低，但卖方的预期收入可能会随着风险厌恶程度的增加而减少或增加。这些结果表明，在没有违约的情况下，卖方更喜欢风险中性的投标人而不是风险规避的投标人，但在违约的情况下，卖方的偏好是模棱两可的，这与在具有某些估值的拍卖中获得的众所周知的结果形成鲜明对比。