The Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience states that microphysical duplicates cannot differ in their intrinsic properties. According to Merricks (Mind 107(425):59–71, 1998a, Objects and persons, Oxford University Press, 2001), however, this thesis is false, since microphysical duplicates can differ with respect to the intrinsic property of consciousness. In my view, Merricks’ argument is plausible, and extant attempts to reject it are problematic. However, the argument also threatens to make consciousness appear mysterious, by implying that consciousness facts fail to be microphysically determined and that there can be brute and inexplicable differences in consciousness between material things. The paper therefore develops an account that can respect the soundness of Merricks’ argument while avoiding these problematic consequences. At the heart of the proposal is the idea that consciousness can be microphysically grounded despite failing to microphysical supervene. The proposed view also has the interesting consequence that consciousness is an intrinsic property despite depending on extrinsic factors for its instantiation.

微物理随附学说指出，微物理副本的内在属性不能不同。然而，根据 Merricks (Mind 107(425):59–71, 1998a, Objects and people, Oxford University Press, 2001)，这个论点是错误的，因为微观物理的重复在意识的内在属性方面可能不同。在我看来，梅里克斯的论点是有道理的，现存的拒绝它的尝试是有问题的。然而，该论点也有可能使意识显得神秘，因为它暗示意识事实无法在微观物理上被确定，并且物质事物之间的意识可能存在残酷且无法解释的差异。因此，该论文提出了一个可以尊重梅里克斯论点的合理性同时避免这些有问题的后果的描述。该提案的核心思想是，尽管未能在微观物理上发生，但意识可以在微观上建立起来。所提出的观点还有一个有趣的结果，即意识是一种内在属性，尽管它的实例化依赖于外在因素。