This paper studies how covenants affect the speed of capital structure adjustment in Brazil, an environment with poor creditor rights. Unlike previous evidence for developed countries, we find that the existence of debt covenants increases the speed of capital structure adjustment by more than 20% for firms that are only domestically listed. For firms that are cross-listed in the US, this effect is smaller (if any), possibly because these firms “bond” to the stricter regulation and creditor protection of the US market. Our results suggest that in emerging markets with poor creditor protection, covenants are an imperfect substitute for strong creditor rights and employed as a signaling device, permitting firms to adjust their leverage towards optimal levels quicker.

本文研究了在债权人权利较差的环境下，契约如何影响巴西资本结构调整的速度。与之前发达国家的证据不同，我们发现债务契约的存在使仅在国内上市的公司的资本结构调整速度提高了 20% 以上。对于在美国交叉上市的公司，这种影响较小（如果有的话），可能是因为这些公司“受制于”美国市场更严格的监管和债权人保护。我们的研究结果表明，在债权人保护较差的新兴市场中，契约不能完美替代强大的债权人权利，并被用作一种信号装置，允许公司更快地将其杠杆率调整到最佳水平。