The problem of induction belongs to the most controversial issues in philosophy of science. If induction is understood widely, it covers every fallible inference, that is, such that its conclusion is not logically entailed by its premises. This paper analyses so-called reductive induction, that is, reasoning in which premises follow from the conclusion, but the reverse relation does not hold. Two issues are taken into account, namely the definition of reductive inference and its justification. The analysis proposed in the paper employs metalogical tools. The author agrees with the view that a quantitative account of degree of confirmation for universal theories via logical probability is problematic. However, prospect for a qualitative approach look as more promising. Using the construction of maximally consistent sets allows to distinguish good and worthless induction as well as shows how to understand induction in a semantic way. A closer analysis of deductivism in the theory of justification shows that it is a hidden inductivism.

归纳问题属于科学哲学中最具争议的问题。如果归纳法被广泛理解，它涵盖了每一个可能出错的推论，也就是说，它的结论不是由它的前提在逻辑上蕴涵的。本文分析了所谓的还原归纳法，即从结论推导出前提而逆向关系不成立的推理。考虑了两个问题，即还原推理的定义及其理由。论文中提出的分析使用了元逻辑工具。作者同意这样一种观点，即通过逻辑概率对普遍理论的确认程度进行定量说明是有问题的。然而，定性方法的前景看起来更有希望。使用最大一致集合的构造可以区分好的归纳和无价值的归纳，并展示如何以语义方式理解归纳。证成论中对演绎主义的进一步分析表明，它是一种隐藏的归纳主义。