This study considers the characterization and implementation of the optimal revenue-sharing mechanism when the seller’s ex-post effort affects the final outcome. In the optimal revenue-sharing mechanism with the seller’s full commitment to effort exertion, the seller commits to the first-best effort. Under the regularity condition guaranteed by the assumption of log-concave density, the optimal mechanism selects the bidder with the highest type, provided that the associated virtual surplus with the seller’s commitment to the first-best effort is positive. A first-price share auction with an appropriate reserve share and an effort commitment scheme can implement the optimal revenue-sharing mechanism. However, a second-price share auction might fail for implementation, such as in a case with two bidders and a uniform type distribution. Lastly, we introduce a sealed-bid share auction called the first-second price share auction, which can implement the optimal mechanism in dominant strategy.

本研究考虑了当卖方的事后努力影响最终结果时最佳收益分享机制的特征和实施。在卖方全力投入的最优收益分享机制中，卖方承诺尽力而为。在由对数凹密度假设保证的规律性条件下，最优机制选择类型最高的投标人，前提是与卖方对第一尽力的承诺相关的虚拟盈余为正。具有适当储备份额和努力承诺方案的首价份额拍卖可以实现最优的收益共享机制。但是，第二价格的股票拍卖可能无法实施，例如在有两个竞标者和统一类型分布的情况下。最后，