In his book The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind: On the Place of the Virtues in Contemporary Epistemology, Jonathan Kvanvig argues that there is an interchangeability of personal and doxastic justification, which ‘blocks the quick route to virtue epistemology’. To prove that personal justification is reducible to doxastic justification, he utilizes λ-calculus expressions that aim to show the logical equivalence of the two notions of justification. In this paper, I argue that he has made an illegitimate move in his translation of the ordinary talk of personal justification into λ-expressions because his translation involves both an elimination from and an addition to the ordinary language. Pace Kvanvig, there is no logical equivalence of personal to doxastic justification. So, his argument for the reducibility of personal to doxastic justification founders. More importantly, since he has failed to disprove that personal justification is irreducibly primitive, he hasn’t shown that the prospects for virtue epistemology are ‘hopeless’.

乔纳森·克万维格（Jonathan Kvanvig）在他的著作《智力美德和心灵的生活：当代认识论中美德的地位》中认为，个人辩护和信念辩护之间存在可互换性，这“阻碍了通往美德认识论的捷径”。为了证明个人辩护可以还原为信念式辩护，他使用了λ -演算表达式，旨在显示辩护的两个概念的逻辑等价。在这篇论文中，我认为他在将个人辩护的普通谈话翻译成λ表达式的过程中做出了不正当的举动，因为他的翻译既包括对普通语言的消除，也包括对日常语言的补充。步伐Kvanvig，个人的正当理由与信仰的正当理由没有逻辑上的对等。因此，他的论点是个人对信念式辩护创始人的可还原性。更重要的是，由于他未能反驳个人辩护是不可还原的原始，因此他没有表明美德认识论的前景是“无望的”。