Using an approach that embodies an explicit tradeoff between need and governance considerations, we propose an optimal aid allocation formula. We first assume exogenous, then endogenous governance. In the former case, a central concept is need-adjusted aid effectiveness while in the second case the donor has policing instruments under the form of monitoring and sanctioning capacities. We show that external disciplining has two advantages when the donor is sensitive enough to poverty intensity: (1) to cater to poor countries to a greater extent than is possible when local governance cannot be influenced by external forces, and (2) to respond (non-perversely) to improvements in the local governance of a country by raising its aid share. In institutionally weak countries, populations should welcome wisely applied donor’s discipline as a way not only to get access to financial support but also to constrain their elites to refrain from abusing their position excessively. Imposing discipline when the release of externally-provided development funds is at stake seems more acceptable than aid directed to the explicit purpose of combatting corruption.

使用体现需求和治理考虑之间明确权衡的方法，我们提出了最佳援助分配公式。我们首先假设外生治理，然后是内生治理。在前一种情况下，一个核心概念是需要调整的援助有效性，而在第二种情况下，捐助者拥有监督和制裁能力形式的警务工具。我们表明，当捐助者对贫困程度足够敏感时，外部约束有两个优势：（1）比当地治理不受外部力量影响时更大程度地迎合贫困国家，以及（2）响应（非反常）通过提高援助份额来改善一个国家的地方治理。在制度薄弱的国家，民众应该欢迎明智地应用捐助者的纪律，这不仅是为了获得财政支持，而且是为了限制他们的精英避免过度滥用他们的地位。当外部提供的发展资金的发放受到威胁时，施加纪律似乎比直接用于打击腐败的明确目的的援助更容易接受。