Purpose

The purpose of the study is to examine the relationship between the board of directors (BODs) and the Shariah board (SB) and assess its impact on the financial soundness of Islamic banks (IBs).

Design/methodology/approach

The authors use a regression model to test the effects of the relationship between the BOD and the SB on the financial soundness of IBs by applying a panel data set of 61 IBs, covering 18 countries from 2008 to 2014. The dependent variable is the Z-score indicator. To test the robustness of the results, the authors use dependent variables other than the Z-score [A rating of Capital adequacy (C), Asset quality (A), Management (M), Earnings (E), Liquidity (L), and Sensitivity (S) (CAMELS)] for 2018.

Findings

The results show that meetings between directors and SB members significantly reduce the financial soundness of IBs. The relationship between the BOD and the SB increases conflicts of interest and agency costs. However, a representation of the SB at the BOD meetings and vice versa does not affect financial soundness. The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions and the Islamic Financial Services Board corporate governance standards do not require the presence of the SB representative at the BOD meetings or vice versa, which justifies the results.

Practical implications

This study attempts to fill gaps in the literature by investigating the impact of meetings between the SB and the BOD on the financial soundness of IBs across the world. The results suggest that the BOD’s frequent interference in the affairs of the SB can have adverse effects on IBs and should be avoided.

Originality/value

The authors depart from the previous literature by using three new characteristics that link the BOD to the SB. Methodologically, the authors use three new measures to evaluate this relationship and its effect on the financial soundness of IBs. This study is unique because it explores the comparative impacts of the presence of a SB representative at the BOD meetings and a director at the SB meetings and meetings between the two governing boards of IBs.

中文翻译：

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董事会和伊斯兰教法董事会对伊斯兰银行财务稳健性的影响

目的

该研究的目的是检查董事会 (BOD) 和伊斯兰教法委员会 (SB) 之间的关系，并评估其对伊斯兰银行 (IB) 财务稳健性的影响。

设计/方法/方法

作者使用回归模型，通过应用 61 家 IB 的面板数据集来检验 BOD 和 SB 之间的关系对 IB 财务稳健性的影响，覆盖 2008 年至 2014 年的 18 个国家。因变量是 Z-分数指标。为了测试结果的稳健性，作者使用了 Z 分数以外的因变量 [资本充足率 (C)、资产质量 (A)、管理 (M)、收益 (E)、流动性 (L)、和灵敏度 (S) (CAMELS)] 为 2018 年。

发现

结果表明，董事和 SB 成员之间的会议显着降低了 IB 的财务稳健性。BOD 和 SB 之间的关系增加了利益冲突和代理成本。但是，SB 在董事会会议上的代表（反之亦然）不会影响财务稳健性。伊斯兰金融机构会计和审计组织和伊斯兰金融服务委员会公司治理标准不要求 SB 代表出席董事会会议，反之亦然，这证明了结果的合理性。

实际影响

本研究试图通过调查 SB 和 BOD 之间的会议对全球 IB 财务稳健性的影响来填补文献空白。结果表明，BOD 频繁干预 SB 的事务会对 IB 产生不利影响，应该避免。

原创性/价值

作者使用了三个将 BOD 与 SB 联系起来的新特征，与之前的文献不同。在方法论上，作者使用了三种新措施来评估这种关系及其对 IB 财务稳健性的影响。这项研究是独一无二的，因为它探讨了 SB 代表出席 BOD 会议和一名董事出席 SB 会议以及两个 IB 理事会之间的会议的比较影响。