This paper studies a simple model of a repeated cartel that can punish using both voluntary fines and inefficient prices wars. The idea is to use the fines in response to noisy signals of bad behavior and back it up with threats of price wars in response to the easily observed failure to pay the voluntary fines. The model is shown to deliver the insights of modern repeated game theory in an empirically accurate and tractable form.

中文翻译：

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精细卡特尔

本文研究了一个重复卡特尔的简单模型，该模型可以使用自愿罚款和低效价格战进行惩罚。这个想法是使用罚款来应对不良行为的嘈杂信号，并以价格战的威胁作为后盾，以应对容易观察到的未能支付自愿罚款的情况。该模型显示出以经验准确和易于处理的形式提供现代重复博弈论的见解。