This paper studies the optimal team contract when the principal observes a noisy ranking of the efforts of the two team members. The objective of this paper is to understand whether it is optimal to use this competition-promoting noisy ranking in a team setting. It is shown that noisy ranking is always part of the optimal contract both in static and repeated settings. Even though noisy ranking promotes competition between team members, it does not have a negative effect on peer monitoring incentives in a repeated setting. In summary, competition does not need to be damaging in a team setting.

中文翻译：

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关于团队内竞争的最优性

本文研究了当校长观察到两个团队成员努力的嘈杂排名时的最佳团队合同。本文的目的是了解在团队环境中使用这种促进竞争的嘈杂排名是否最佳。结果表明，在静态和重复设置中，噪声排名始终是最佳合约的一部分。尽管嘈杂的排名促进了团队成员之间的竞争，但它不会对重复设置中的同行监控激励产生负面影响。总而言之，在团队环境中，竞争并不一定是破坏性的。