This paper models and predicts how the strengthening of intellectual property (IP) protection will impact R&D in developing economies. International agreements such as TRIPs and free trade agreements are enhancing the level of international control on IP. This is changing deeply the R&D environment in developing economies by restraining illegal channels of knowledge accumulation such as imitation, reverse engineering and piracy. An asymmetric and non-cooperative two-stage (R&D-Production) game is proposed to model a developing market where two local firms compete with a more innovative foreign firm. Equilibrium R&D expenditures and profits of the competing firms are compared for different levels of: market technology, technological gaps and IP protection. The proposed model shows clearly that a stringent enforcement of IP agreements will dramatically decrease the innovative abilities of developing economies especially in high technological sectors. The maintain and increase of their R&D skills will not be possible without a reduction of their technological gap and strong incentives to initiate regulatory (or permit tacit) R&D cooperation between local firms.

本文对加强知识产权 (IP) 保护将如何影响发展中经济体的研发进行建模和预测。TRIPs 和自由贸易协定等国际协议正在提高对知识产权的国际控制水平。通过抑制模仿、逆向工程和盗版等非法知识积累渠道，正在深刻改变发展中经济体的研发环境。提出了一个不对称和非合作的两阶段（研发-生产）博弈来模拟一个发展中市场，其中两家本地公司与一家更具创新性的外国公司竞争。比较竞争公司的均衡研发支出和利润，包括市场技术、技术差距和知识产权保护。拟议的模型清楚地表明，严格执行知识产权协议将大大降低发展中经济体的创新能力，尤其是在高科技领域。如果不缩小他们的技术差距和强有力的激励来启动当地公司之间的监管（或默许）研发合作，就不可能保持和提高他们的研发技能。