Trade negotiations now center on regulations. This paper argues that these negotiations can raise uncertainty over fixed costs. We develop a simple model of exporter competition to show how uncertainty generated by negotiations redistributes profits across firms. We show that regulatory uncertainty reduces competition by deterring entry on the part of less productive firms and shifting market share toward top producers. Empirically, we show that this negotiation-driven uncertainty can help explain the economically concentrating effects of preferential agreements. Preferential trade agreements combine tariff concessions with regulatory changes that ensure the benefits of the agreement are limited to member states. Using novel data covering firm-level export activity and public investment decisions in the automotive and automotive parts sectors during NAFTA, we find that negotiation-driven uncertainty deterred non-North American producers while benefiting the top American auto manufacturers.

中文翻译：

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谈判排除：优惠贸易协定中的监管壁垒

贸易谈判现在以法规为中心。本文认为，这些谈判可能会增加固定成本的不确定性。我们开发了一个简单的出口商竞争模型，以展示谈判产生的不确定性如何在公司之间重新分配利润。我们表明，监管不确定性通过阻止生产力较低的公司进入并将市场份额转移给顶级生产商来减少竞争。根据经验，我们表明这种谈判驱动的不确定性可以帮助解释优惠协议的经济集中效应。优惠贸易协定将关税减让与确保协定利益仅限于成员国的监管变化相结合。