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Fritz London and the measurement problem: a phenomenological approach
Continental Philosophy Review Pub Date : 2020-11-03 , DOI: 10.1007/s11007-020-09521-w
Pedro M. S. Alves

In this paper, I discuss the possible relations between Fritz London’s account of the status of the observer in quantum physics and transcendental phenomenology. Firstly, I discuss Steven French’s interpretation of London’s thesis as a phenomenological account of the status of the observer, along with the objections Otávio Bueno has brought forward. Secondly, refusing in part both French’s and Bueno’s theses for several reasons, I propose another way of reading London’s thesis in the framework of transcendental phenomenology. Namely, I put London’s account of the observer against the backdrop of Husserl’s analyses of the objectifying acts and objectual constitution. Finally, I end this article with some criticisms of what seems to me the ontological indigency of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics, to whose “spirit” London also belongs.



中文翻译:

Fritz London 和测量问题:一种现象学方法

在这篇论文中,我讨论了弗里茨·伦敦关于量子物理学中观察者地位的描述与先验现象学之间可能存在的关系。首先,我讨论了史蒂文·弗伦奇 (Steven French) 将伦敦的论文解释为观察者地位的现象学解释,以及奥塔维奥·布埃诺 (Otávio Bueno) 提出的反对意见。其次,出于若干原因,部分拒绝法国和布埃诺的论文,我提出了在先验现象学框架内阅读伦敦论文的另一种方式。也就是说,我将伦敦对观察者的描述置于胡塞尔对客观化行为和客观构成的分析的背景下。最后,我对在我看来似乎是哥本哈根量子物理学解释的本体论贫乏的一些批评来结束这篇文章,

更新日期:2020-11-03
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