The work of Gabriel Marcel is retrieved and set in relation to the question of moral epistemology. I begin by surveying Marcel’s long-running critique of a false dilemma with implications for the nature of our knowledge of values. According to this dilemma, a person’s knowledge of something is either objective, and therefore transcendent but impersonal, or it is subjective, and therefore personal but immanent, reaching only one’s inner states. Applied to the knowledge of values, this false dilemma leaves philosophy with a choice between accounts of value-knowledge as scientific/objective knowledge or value-knowledge as self-knowledge. Building on Marcel’s critique of this false dilemma, I suggest a program for a Marcelian moral epistemology that identifies the comportments by which human person are receptive to values and hence to knowledge of values. Two examples of such comportment are discussed in relation to the problem of value-knowledge: exigence and fidelity.

中文翻译：

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虚假的困境和价值观的知识

Gabriel Marcel 的作品被检索并与道德认识论问题相关。我首先调查了马塞尔长期以来对错误困境的批评，这些评论对我们的价值观知识的性质有影响。根据这个困境，一个人对某事的认识要么是客观的，因此是超然的但非个人的，要么是主观的，因此是个人的但内在的，只达到一个人的内在状态。应用于价值知识，这种错误的困境让哲学在将价值知识作为科学/客观知识或作为自我知识的价值知识之间做出选择。基于马塞尔对这种错误困境的批判，我建议为马塞利安道德认识论制定一个计划，该计划确定人类接受价值并因此接受价值知识的行为。关于价值知识的问题，我们讨论了这种行为的两个例子：紧急和忠诚。