Since the neoclassical revolution of the 1870s, reasoning and analysis in economic theory has been dominated by utility theory, in which: Action implies Outcome implies Utility. I describe three prominent and unexpected failures of this utilitarian framework to predict the replicable outcomes of experiments. First, in supply and demand experiments for non‐durables the predicted equilibrium obtains, but under conditions violating those thought necessary: complete information, large numbers and price‐taking behavior. The failure is in not accounting for the weak conditions under which equilibrium is actually attained. Second, in asset markets it is thought that price bubbles cannot rationally occur under complete common information on fundamental value. Replicable experiments consistently yield price bubbles in violation of this prediction. Third, in two‐person trust and ultimatum games, equilibrium predicted outcomes failed decisively and massively. The observed failures stem from modelling only the outcome consequences of actions, not “the impulses from which action proceeds.” Utility theory rigidly binds the origins of action to their outcome value, thereby trumping alternative mental models of the actor.

中文翻译：

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代理人社会和经济行动的心理模型中的因果动机与结果动机：实验和经济学中的新古典主义转向

自 1870 年代的新古典主义革命以来，经济理论中的推理和分析一直被效用理论所主导，其中： 行动意味着结果意味着效用。我描述了这个功利主义框架在预测实验的可复制结果方面的三个突出和意想不到的失败。首先，在非耐用品的供需实验中，预测的均衡获得了，但在违反那些认为必要的条件下：完整的信息、大量的和价格接受行为。失败在于没有考虑实际达到平衡的弱条件。其次，在资产市场上，人们认为在基本价值的完全共同信息下，价格泡沫不可能理性地发生。可复制的实验不断产生违反这一预测的价格泡沫。第三，在两人信任和最后通牒博弈中，均衡预测结果果断而大规模地失败。观察到的失败源于仅对行动的结果后果进行建模，而不是“行动产生的冲动”。效用理论严格地将行动的起源与其结果价值联系在一起，从而战胜了行动者的替代心理模型。