When participating in school choice, students may incur information acquisition costs to learn about school quality. This paper investigates how two popular school choice mechanisms, the (Boston) Immediate Acceptance and the Deferred Acceptance, incentivize students’ information acquisition. Specifically, we show that only the Immediate Acceptance mechanism incentivizes students to learn their own cardinal and others’ preferences. We demonstrate that information acquisition costs affect the efficiency of each mechanism and the welfare ranking between the two. In the case where everyone has the same ordinal preferences, we evaluate the welfare effects of various information provision policies by education authorities.

在参与学校选择时，学生可能会产生信息获取成本来了解学校质量。本文调查了两种流行的择校机制，（波士顿）立即接受和延期接受，如何激励学生的信息获取。具体来说，我们表明只有立即接受机制才能激励学生学习他们自己的主要偏好和其他人的偏好。我们证明了信息获取成本会影响每种机制的效率以及两者之间的福利排名。在每个人都有相同的顺序偏好的情况下，我们评估教育当局各种信息提供政策的福利效果。