We present a model of media coverage of corporate announcements. Firms strategically use the media to communicate corporate announcements to a group of traders who observe announcements not directly but through media reports. Journalists strategically select which announcements to report to readers. Media coverage inadvertently incentivizes firms to manipulate the underlying announcements. In equilibrium, media coverage is tilted towards less manipulated negative news. The presence of financial journalists leads to more manipulation but makes stock prices more informative on average. We provide additional predictions regarding the media’s impact on the quality of firm announcements and stock prices.

我们提出了一个公司公告的媒体报道模型。公司战略性地使用媒体将公司公告传达给一群交易者，这些交易者不是直接观察公告，而是通过媒体报道。记者战略性地选择向读者报告的公告。媒体报道无意中激励公司操纵基本公告。在平衡状态下，媒体报道倾向于较少被操纵的负面新闻。财经记者的出现导致更多的操纵，但平均而言使股价更具信息性。我们就媒体对公司公告质量和股票价格的影响提供了额外的预测。