to outshine the other. The author rightly concludes that the early visits were not characterized by in-depth diplomatic discussions or alliance-forging, but ‘created a powerful image of friendship and unity that soon gained its political dynamic’ (p. 117). Goeschel’s methodological concept of ‘new diplomacy’ is interesting and has its strengths, but it also has its weaknesses and the author appears at times too focused on making his paradigm fit: while presenting Hitler’s departure by plane to Venice in June 1934 as new style diplomacy, the author himself acknowledges that crossing Austria by train was not an option for the German dictator. The desire to prove symbolic acts of rivalry sometimes seems far-fetched, for example, in describing an episode during Mussolini’s visit in September 1937 (p. 84). Indeed, the international history of the interwar period and the opening remarks on summitry and diplomacy could have been further explored. Face-toface meetings, unofficial backchannels and summits held behind closed doors without diplomatic advisers were hardly an invention by Hitler and Mussolini. Clearly, the staging of leadership cults, friendship for a ‘New Order’ and mobilization of the masses (to whatever extent that worked, as Goeschel rightly points out) were sui generis, but did we not know that already? Wolfgang Schieder, who has published widely in this field before, convincingly sketches Hitler as a ‘political sorcerer’s apprentice’ of Mussolini and covers similar fields like Goeschel, with less accentuation of the ‘new diplomacy’ and symbolism paradigms. His conclusions, however, are largely the same. Schieder shows Hitler’s (long unreturned) admiration for Mussolini and his double strategy of mass mobilization and paramilitarism alongside legal ways to get to power. Schieder rightly emphasizes Hitler’s special attention to the South Tyrol question (which caused him trouble in Germany) and the gradual change of the power balance between the dictators after 1933. Despite declining fortunes during the war, Hitler remained loyal to Mussolini and upheld this political friendship beyond public bravados. In sum, the criticisms raised above will probably only interest specialists in the field. A broader audience will benefit from both studies as they draw together existing research in all languages, update prior works on the two dictators, and introduce new methodological approaches.

中文翻译：

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书评：战争中的历史学家：冷战对西班牙内战英美代表的影响

超越对方。作者正确地得出结论，早期访问的特点不是深入的外交讨论或结盟，而是“创造了一种强大的友谊和团结的形象，很快就获得了政治动力”（第 117 页）。戈舍尔关于“新外交”的方法论概念很有趣，有其优点，但也有其弱点，作者有时似乎过于专注于使他的范式适合：同时将希特勒于 1934 年 6 月乘飞机前往威尼斯描述为新式外交，作者本人承认乘坐火车穿越奥地利不是德国独裁者的选择。例如，在描述 1937 年 9 月墨索里尼访问期间的一个插曲时，证明竞争的象征性行为的愿望有时似乎有些牵强（第 84 页）。确实，可以进一步探讨两次世界大战期间的国际历史以及关于首脑会议和外交的开场白。面对面的会议、非正式的秘密渠道和在没有外交顾问的情况下闭门举行的峰会几乎不是希特勒和墨索里尼的发明。显然，领导崇拜的上演、“新秩序”的友谊和群众动员（无论在何种程度上起作用，正如戈舍尔正确指出的那样）都是自成一格的，但我们不是已经知道了吗？沃尔夫冈·席德曾在这一领域发表过大量著作，他令人信服地将希特勒描绘成墨索里尼的“政治巫师学徒”，涵盖了与戈舍尔类似的领域，较少强调“新外交”和象征主义范式。然而，他的结论大致相同。席德展示了希特勒（长期未归还）对墨索里尼的钦佩和他的群众动员和准军事主义的双重战略，以及通过合法途径获得权力的双重战略。席德正确地强调了希特勒对南蒂罗尔问题的特别关注（这给他在德国造成了麻烦）以及 1933 年后独裁者之间权力平衡的逐渐变化。 尽管战争期间财富下降，但希特勒仍然忠于墨索里尼并维护了这种政治友谊超越公众的虚张声势。总之，上面提出的批评可能只会引起该领域的专家的兴趣。更广泛的受众将从这两项研究中受益，因为它们汇集了所有语言的现有研究，更新了关于这两个独裁者的先前工作，并引入了新的方法论方法。