In The Metaethics of Constitutional Adjudication, Boško Tripković attempts to ‘offer a theory of ethical arguments in constitutional adjudication that would be supported by a sound understanding of value’ (p. 6). The book is a revised version of the author’s PhD thesis. The book seeks to take moral argument in constitutional reasoning seriously on its own terms. Tripković asks whether, instead of specific moral judgments in specific legal disputes, judges might have got ‘morality itself wrong’ (p. 8). Hence, this book raises a Socratic challenge: the confrontation with the figure of the philosopher who challenges the judicial establishment to demonstrate that their conception of value in constitutional reasoning is ultimately justified. The author observes that ‘there is much confusion and uncertainty about the nature of value in comparative constitutional adjudication’ (p. 2). The danger is that the ethical value judgments which constitutional judges routinely make in the context of vague and indeterminate constitutional texts – for example, in cases related to the death penalty or to abortion – could potentially be unjustified because of a flawed theory of moral value. At first glance, one might be tempted to think that Tripković thereby attempts to make a contribution to the debate surrounding the legitimacy of judicial review. This is not the case; his ambition is better understood as situated in the tradition of grand philosophical theory: ‘If we inquired about the metaethical foundations of judicial value-based arguments we would not only see some of the old problems of constitutional adjudication in a new light, and possibly resolve them, but we might also reach a non-question-begging justification of our values. Our philosophical spade would reach bedrock, and we would have a mechanism by which we could assess and refine’ moral arguments in

中文翻译：

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在宪法裁决中获得道德权利 - Boško Tripković，宪法裁决的元伦理学（牛津大学出版社 2017 年）第 272 页。

在宪法裁决的元伦理学中，博什科·特里普科维奇试图“在宪法裁决中提供一种伦理论证理论，该理论将得到对价值的合理理解的支持”（第 6 页）。本书是作者博士论文的修订版。这本书力求以自己的方式认真对待宪法推理中的道德论证。Tripković 询问，法官是否可能在“道德本身错误”（第 8 页）而不是在特定法律纠纷中做出特定道德判断。因此，本书提出了苏格拉底式的挑战：与挑战司法机构的哲学家形象的对抗，以证明他们在宪法推理中的价值观念最终是合理的。作者观察到“比较宪法裁决中的价值性质存在很多混淆和不确定性”（第 2 页）。危险在于，宪法法官通常在模糊和不确定的宪法文本的背景下做出的伦理价值判断——例如，在与死刑或堕胎有关的案件中——可能会因为道德价值理论的缺陷而变得不合理。乍一看，人们可能会认为特里科维奇试图为围绕司法审查合法性的辩论做出贡献。不是这种情况; 他的野心被更好地理解为位于宏大哲学理论的传统中：“如果我们探究基于价值的司法论证的元伦理学基础，我们不仅会从新的角度看待宪法审判的一些老问题，并可能解决这些问题，而且我们还可能会得出一种非质疑性的辩护理由我们的价值。我们的哲学铁锹将触及基石，我们将拥有一种机制，通过它我们可以评估和完善“道德论据”