ABSTRACT

We propose a fundamental challenge to the feasibility of moral progress: most extant theories of progress, we will argue, assume an unrealistic level of cognitive control people must have over their moral judgments for moral progress to occur. Moral progress depends at least in part on the possibility of individual people improving their moral cognition to eliminate the pernicious influence of various epistemically defective biases and other distorting factors. Since the degree of control people can exert over their moral cognition tends to be significantly overestimated, the prospects of moral progress face a formidable problem, the force of which has thus far been underappreciated. In the paper, we will provide both conceptual and empirical arguments for this thesis, and explain its most important implications.

摘要

我们对道德进步的可行性提出了一个根本性的挑战：我们将论证，大多数现存的进步理论都假设人们必须对他们的道德判断进行不切实际的认知控制才能发生道德进步。道德进步至少部分取决于个人提高道德认知以消除各种认知缺陷偏见和其他扭曲因素的有害影响的可能性。由于人们对其道德认知的控制程度往往被严重高估，道德进步的前景面临着一个艰巨的问题，其力量迄今未被充分认识。在本文中，我们将为本文提供概念和经验论据，并解释其最重要的含义。