Critics often accuse Congress of abdicating its constitutional authority in foreign policy. One source of evidence of congressional abdication is the relative lack of legislation authorizing foreign aid and other foreign policy tools. Because of recent gridlock, Congress now authorizes foreign policy the only way it can: in annual appropriations bills. I argue that this change in legislative strategy does not necessarily reflect an abdication by Congress. Instead, an increase in party polarization, which leads to the perceived abdication of foreign policy, simply shifts Congress’s legislating abilities to “limitation riders,” or legislative provisions written into appropriations bills. I find that an increase in polarization increases Congress’s use of these riders. I also find that polarization has encouraged Congress to use limitation riders in new ways. While foreign aid-related limitation riders once only consisted of contract and budget-related issues, they now comprise a wide variety of foreign and domestic policy issues. Congressional reliance on limitation riders has increased due to polarization and has consequences for foreign policy.

批评者经常指责国会放弃其在外交政策中的宪法权威。国会退位的一个证据来源是相对缺乏授权外援和其他外交政策工具的立法。由于最近的僵局，国会现在以唯一的方式授权外交政策：通过年度拨款法案。我认为立法策略的这种变化并不一定反映国会的退位。相反，党派两极分化加剧，导致外交政策被视为放弃，只会将国会的立法能力转移到“限制条款”，或写入拨款法案的立法条款。我发现两极分化的增加会增加国会对这些骑手的使用。我还发现两极分化鼓励国会以新的方式使用限制条款。虽然与外援相关的限制条款曾经只包括与合同和预算相关的问题，但它们现在包括各种各样的国内外政策问题。由于两极分化，国会对限制附加条款的依赖增加，并对外交政策产生影响。