Many accounts of the morality of abortion assume that early fetuses must all have or lack moral status in virtue of developmental features that they share. Our actual attitudes toward early fetuses don’t reflect this all-or-nothing assumption. If we start with the assumption that our attitudes toward fetuses are accurately tracking their value, then we need an account of fetal moral status that can explain why it is appropriate to love some fetuses but not others. I argue that a fetus can come to have moral claims on persons who have taken up the activity of person-creation.

中文翻译：

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这很复杂：我们对怀孕、堕胎和流产的态度告诉我们早期胎儿的道德状况

许多关于堕胎道德的论述都假定，早期胎儿必须都具有或缺乏道德地位，因为它们具有共同的发育特征。我们对早期胎儿的实际态度并未反映这种全有或全无的假设。如果我们从假设我们对胎儿的态度准确地跟踪它们的价值开始，那么我们需要一个关于胎儿道德状况的说明，它可以解释为什么爱一些胎儿而不是其他胎儿是合适的。我认为，胎儿可以对从事人格创造活动的人产生道德要求。