We show how bundling, exclusivity and additional markets internalize fire sale and other pecuniary externalities. Ex ante competition can achieve a constrained efficient allocation. The solution can be put rather simply: create segregated market exchanges which specify prices in advance and price the right to trade in these markets so that participant types pay, or are compensated, consistent with the market exchange they choose and that type's excess demand contribution to the price in that exchange. We do not need to identify and quantify some policy intervention. With the appropriate ex ante design we can let markets solve the problem.

中文翻译：

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基于市场的火力销售和其他金钱外部性解决方案

我们展示了捆绑销售、排他性和额外市场如何将甩卖和其他金钱外部性内部化。事前竞争可以实现有约束的有效分配。解决方案可以简单地说：创建隔离的市场交易所，预先指定价格并为在这些市场上交易的权利定价，以便参与者类型支付或得到补偿，与他们选择的市场交易所以及该类型的超额需求贡献一致该交易所的价格。我们不需要识别和量化某些政策干预。通过适当的事前设计，我们可以让市场解决问题。