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Sequential Auctions with Synergy and Affiliation Across Auctions
Journal of Political Economy ( IF 9.637 ) Pub Date : 2021-01-01 , DOI: 10.1086/711402
Yunmi Kong

This paper performs a structural analysis of sequential auctions with both synergy and affiliation across auctions. I propose a flexible yet tractable sequential auction model under the private value paradigm and establish its nonparametric identification, demonstrating an intuitive and general method for disentangling synergy from affiliation. After developing an estimation procedure closely tied to the identification steps, I apply it to data on adjacent oil and gas leases that are auctioned sequentially. I assess the role played by affiliation versus synergy in the observed allocation patterns and evaluate the counterfactual policy of bundled auctions.

中文翻译:

具有协同作用和跨拍卖关联的顺序拍卖

本文对具有协同作用和关联性的连续拍卖进行了结构分析。我在私人价值范式下提出了一个灵活但易于处理的顺序拍卖模型,并建立了它的非参数识别,展示了一种直观和通用的方法,可以将协同作用与从属关系分开。在开发出与识别步骤密切相关的估算程序后,我将其应用于按顺序拍卖的相邻石油和天然气租赁的数据。我评估了从属关系与协同作用在观察到的分配模式中所起的作用,并评估了捆绑拍卖的反事实政策。
更新日期:2021-01-01
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