ABSTRACT

Related party transactions (RPTs) are a primary way for corporate insiders to expropriate company value. Conventional wisdom in corporate law theory holds however that RPTs entered into by directors/managers (rather than controlling shareholders) are of lesser concern in both controlled and dispersedly-owned companies. This article challenges this conventional wisdom and puts forward various other theories under which RPTs entered into by directors/managers remain a significant concern in terms of value-diversion in both share-ownership structures. The article then presents hand-collected data of RPTs entered into by directors/managers who are not significant/controlling shareholders in companies listed on the prime standard of the German stock exchange. This dataset and its evaluation provide preliminary indications and exploratory evidence regarding the threat posed by RPTs entered into by abovementioned persons. Furthermore, up-to-date share-ownership data of those companies and several findings regarding disclosure practices are provided. The article closes with proposing a few regulatory improvements and implications.

摘要

关联方交易（RPT）是企业内部人士侵占公司价值的主要方式。然而，公司法理论中的传统观点认为，董事/经理（而不是控股股东）订立的 RPT 在受控公司和分散拥有的公司中都不太受关注。本文挑战了这种传统智慧，并提出了各种其他理论，根据这些理论，董事/经理签订的 RPT 在两种股权结构中的价值转移方面仍然是一个重要问题。然后，本文介绍了在德国证券交易所主要标准上市的公司中非重要/控股股东的董事/经理签订的 RPT 数据。该数据集及其评估提供了有关上述人员输入的 RPT 所构成威胁的初步迹象和探索性证据。此外，还提供了这些公司的最新股权数据以及有关披露做法的一些调查结果。文章最后提出了一些监管改进和影响。