ABSTRACT

What kind of basic minimum do we owe to others? This paper defends a new procedure for answering this question. It argues that its minimally good life account has some advantages over the main alternatives and that neither the first-, nor third-, person perspective can help us to arrive at an adequate account. Rather, it employs the second-person perspective of free, reasonable, care. There might be other conditions for distributive justice, and morality certainly requires more than helping everyone to secure a basic minimum. Still, if the minimally good life account is correct, and we owe everyone a basic minimum, we must ensure that everyone lives well enough.

摘要

我们欠他人的最低限度是什么？本文为回答这个问题的新程序辩护。它认为，其最低限度的美好生活描述比主要替代方案具有一些优势，第一人称或第三人称视角都不能帮助我们得出一个充分的描述。相反，它采用了自由、合理、关怀的第二人称视角。分配正义可能还有其他条件，而道德当然需要的不仅仅是帮助每个人获得基本的最低限度。尽管如此，如果最低限度的美好生活账户是正确的，我们欠每个人一个基本的最低限度，我们必须确保每个人都生活得足够好。