Is socially efficient taxation conducive to the win-win solution associated with the strong version of the Porter Hypothesis? Using a Bertrand duopoly yielding a continuum of Nash equilibria, we show that this is true for almost any level of environmental damage and equilibrium pricing strategy. We also prove that the only case in which no conflict arises between private and public incentives is where firms price at marginal cost. This finding suggests that coordination between environmental and competition authorities would be highly desirable.

中文翻译：

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Bertrand竞争下的最优排放税和波特假设

具有社会效率的税收是否有利于与波特假设的强版本相关的双赢解决方案？使用产生连续纳什均衡的伯特兰双头垄断，我们表明这对于几乎任何水平的环境破坏和均衡定价策略都是正确的。我们还证明了私人和公共激励之间没有冲突的唯一情况是公司以边际成本定价。这一发现表明，环境和竞争主管机构之间的协调将是非常可取的。