Tax enforcement not only detects tax evasion (the direct effect) but also enforces voluntary compliance (the indirect effect). This paper explores implications of the indirect effect for the optimal size of the budget allocated to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The conventional wisdom prescribes that the size of the budget allocated to the IRS should always fall short of the level where an additional dollar allocated would return just an additional dollar of revenue. In a model where taxpayers are subject to a small amount of incomplete information, we show that after taking into consideration the indirect effect of tax enforcement, it is possible that the optimal prescription is opposite to the conventional wisdom.

中文翻译：

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我们应该为美国国税局提供多少资金？

税收执法不仅检测逃税（直接影响），而且强制自愿遵守（间接影响）。本文探讨了间接影响对分配给美国国税局 (IRS) 的最佳预算规模的影响。传统观念规定，分配给 IRS 的预算规模应始终低于分配的额外美元只会带来额外收入的水平。在纳税人受制于少量不完全信息的模型中，我们表明，在考虑税收执法的间接影响后，最优处方可能与传统智慧相反。