When subordinates have suffered an unfairness, managers sometimes try to compensate them by allocating something extra that belongs to the organization. These reactions, which we label as managerial Robin Hood behaviors, are undertaken without the consent of senior leadership. In four studies, we present and test a theory of managerial Robin Hoodism. In study 1, we found that managers themselves reported engaging in Robin Hoodism for various reasons, including a moral concern with restoring justice. Study 2 results suggested that managerial Robin Hoodism is more likely to occur when the justice violations involve distributive and interpersonal justice rather than procedural justice violations. In studies 3 and 4, when moral identity (trait or primed) was low, both distributive and interpersonal justice violations showed similar relationships to managerial Robin Hoodism. However, when moral identity was high, interpersonal justice violations showed a strong relationship to managerial Robin Hoodism regardless of the level of distributive justice.

当下属遭受不公平待遇时，管理者有时会试图通过分配属于组织的额外东西来补偿他们。这些反应，我们称之为管理罗宾汉行为，未经上级领导同意而进行。在四项研究中，我们提出并检验了管理罗宾汉主义理论。在研究 1 中，我们发现管理者自己报告说出于各种原因参与了罗宾汉主义，包括对恢复正义的道德担忧。研究 2 结果表明，当正义违反涉及分配正义和人际正义而不是程序正义违反时，管理罗宾汉主义更有可能发生。在研究 3 和 4 中，当道德认同（特质或启动）较低时，分配正义和人际正义的违反都显示出与管理罗宾汉主义相似的关系。然而，当道德认同较高时，无论分配正义的水平如何，人际正义的侵犯都与管理罗宾汉主义表现出密切的关系。