Ito (2021) is a wonderful survey article assessing Abenomics. It is a well-balanced and appropriate discussion of Abenomics, particularly, the first arrow (that is, unconventional monetary easing) and the second arrow (that is, flexible fiscal spending). Although I basically agree with Ito's discussion, I have three comments.

My first comment is on the general assessment of how effective Abenomics was. A salient feature of the Japanese economy before Abenomics was the delayed recovery from the Global Financial Crisis. Although the financial markets remained healthy, the global recession had hit the export sectors. As a result, Japan experienced serious output declines. More importantly, the recovery of gross domestic product (GDP) was slow. This was partly because of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011. However, even before the earthquake, “deflation” was prolonged. This might be attributable to the inappropriate economic policies of previous administrations. The role of Abenomics was to fix these economic policies and make them normal. It is, however, controversial whether the recovery was so spectacular.

Since the start of Abenomics, employment improved remarkably in the labor market. The corporate sector showed a significant increase in profits. The GDP gap turned positive. However, under Abenomics, there were many weak indicators in the economy. In the labor market, despite a serious labor shortage, nominal wage growth was modest and real wages declined. Increases in consumer prices were far below the Bank of Japan's (BOJ's) 2% target. In the corporate sector, productivity showed only a slow recovery and cash/deposit holdings accumulated substantially.

It should also be noted that Abenomics made a remarkable performance only in 2013. The recovery slowed down after 2014. This slowdown might be partly attributable to the consumption tax increase in April 2014. Consumption became sluggish after the tax increase. However, macro variables which were less likely to be affected by the tax increase also stagnated after 2014. For example, nonresidential investment had a negative annual growth rate of −0.4% from 2014 to 2019.

My second comment relates to the Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE) implemented by the BOJ. It was effective in 2013. However, regardless of the further monetary expansion, it became less effective around 2016. One possible reason was that the BOJ could not achieve its commitment. When introducing QQE on April 2013, the BOJ governor made a commitment that it would achieve the inflation target (IT) “with a time horizon of about two years.” Soon after the announcement, the inflation rate rose substantially, which made the commitment seemingly credible. However, after the inflation rate started to decline in the latter half of 2014, it became apparent that the BOJ could not achieve the commitment. It is likely that the failure to achieve the IT in 2 years made the BOJ's commitment less credible.

Before QQE started, the BOJ's forecasts of core inflation rates had been accurate. In the Shirakawa regime, the BOJ rarely made any substantial revision of its inflation rate forecasts. However, they become far from accurate in the Kuroda regime. After QQE started, the BOJ forecasted that inflation rates would be around 2% in next 2 years repeatedly. Unfortunately, none of these optimistic forecasts were realized. Instead, the forecast of 2% was eventually revised to 0% for FY2015 and −0.2% for FY2016. It is likely that these substantial downward revisions reduced the BOJ's credibility and failed to anchor inflation expectations at the targeted level (see Fukuda & Soma, 2019).

My third comment is on the third arrow of Abenomics, that is, the “growth strategy.” The first shot of Abenomics, especially the first arrow, was successful. However, the BOJ will not be able to continue its very expansionary monetary policy forever. The second arrow, that is, fiscal policy, will also be limited because of accumulated deficits. To make Abenomics successful eventually, we needed dramatic structural reforms of the economy. The third arrow might be outside the scope of Ito (2021), but various structural problems remained unresolved under Abenomics. Japan has two unique and more serious structural problems. One is the unprecedented accumulation of government debt and the other is a rapidly growing population aging. Since Ito discussed fiscal deficits extensively in his section 3, I will argue about population aging.

The decline in the working-age population and increase in the retired-age population are expected to be dramatic in next few decades. The Abe administration aimed to mitigate their impacts through reforms. It also aimed to realize a drastic reduction in social security expenditure. However, the reforms were insufficient. Structural reforms would be useful not only to enhance the growth potential from the supply-side, but also to push up the economy from the demand-side. In Japan, there has been a strong pessimism about the future growth prospects in both the household and corporate sectors. If effective structural reforms eliminate this pessimism, domestic consumption and capital investment will increase and the prolonged stagnation will be resolved.

伊藤 ( 2021 ) 是一篇评估安倍经济学的精彩调查文章。这是对安倍经济学的平衡和恰当的讨论，特别是第一支箭（即非常规货币宽松）和第二支箭（即灵活的财政支出）。虽然我基本同意伊藤的讨论，但我有三点意见。

我的第一个评论是对安倍经济学有效性的总体评估。在安倍经济学之前，日本经济的一个显着特征是从全球金融危机中延迟复苏。尽管金融市场保持健康，但全球经济衰退打击了出口部门。结果，日本经历了严重的产量下降。更重要的是，国内生产总值（GDP）恢复缓慢。部分原因是 2011 年东日本大地震。然而，即使在地震之前，“通货紧缩”也被延长了。这可能是前几届政府不恰当的经济政策造成的。安倍经济学的作用是修复这些经济政策并使之正常化。然而，这种复苏是否如此壮观仍存在争议。

自安倍经济学开始以来，劳动力市场的就业情况显着改善。企业部门利润显着增长。GDP缺口转正。然而，在安倍经济学之下，经济中出现了许多疲软的指标。在劳动力市场，尽管劳动力严重短缺，但名义工资增长温和，实际工资下降。消费者价格涨幅远低于日本央行 (BOJ) 2% 的目标。在企业部门，生产力仅显示缓慢复苏，现金/存款持有量大幅增加。

还需要注意的是，安倍经济学在2013年才表现出色，2014年后复苏放缓，部分原因可能是2014年4月消费税上调，消费税上调后消费低迷。然而，不太可能受增税影响的宏观变量在2014年之后也停滞不前。例如，非住宅投资在2014年至2019年的年增长率为-0.4%。

我的第二个评论与日本央行实施的定量和定性货币宽松 (QQE) 有关。它在 2013 年生效。然而，尽管货币进一步扩张，它在 2016 年左右变得不那么有效。一个可能的原因是日本央行无法实现其承诺。在 2013 年 4 月推出 QQE 时，日本央行行长承诺将在“大约两年的时间范围内”实现通胀目标（IT）。公告发布后不久，通胀率大幅上升，这使得该承诺看似可信。然而，在 2014 年下半年通胀率开始下降后，日本央行显然无法兑现承诺。很可能由于 2 年内未能实现 IT，日本央行的承诺不太可信。

在 QQE 开始之前，日本央行对核心通胀率的预测是准确的。在白川政权时期，日本央行很少对其通胀率预测进行任何实质性修订。然而，它们在黑田东彦政权中变得远非准确。QQE启动后，日本央行反复预测未来2年通胀率将在2%左右。不幸的是，这些乐观的预测都没有实现。相反，2015 财年 2% 的预测最终修改为 0%，2016 财年为 -0.2%。这些大幅下调很可能降低了日本央行的可信度，未能将通胀预期锚定在目标水平（见 Fukuda & Soma，  2019 年）。

我的第三个评论是安倍经济学的第三支箭，即“增长战略”。安倍经济学的第一枪，尤其是第一箭，成功了。然而，日本央行将无法永远继续其扩张性的货币政策。第二支箭，即财政政策，也将因累积赤字而受到限制。为了最终使安倍经济学取得成功，我们需要对经济进行重大的结构性改革。第三支箭可能在伊藤的范围之外（2021)，但在安倍经济学下，各种结构性问题仍未得到解决。日本有两个独特且更为严重的结构性问题。一是政府债务史无前例的积累，二是快速增长的人口老龄化。由于伊藤在他的第 3 节中广泛讨论了财政赤字，我将讨论人口老龄化问题。

预计未来几十年劳动年龄人口的下降和退休年龄人口的增加将是戏剧性的。安倍政府旨在通过改革减轻其影响。它还旨在实现社会保障支出的大幅减少。但是，改革力度不够。结构性改革不仅有利于从供给侧提升增长潜力，也有利于从需求侧拉动经济增长。在日本，人们对家庭和企业部门的未来增长前景抱有强烈的悲观情绪。如果有效的结构性改革消除这种悲观情绪，国内消费和资本投资将增加，长期停滞将得到解决。