Abstract

We estimate the causal real economic effects of a randomized anti-corruption crackdown on local governments in Brazil using rich micro-data on corruption and firms. After anti-corruption audits, municipalities experience an increase in the number of firms concentrated in sectors most dependent on government relationships and public procurement. Through the estimation of geographic spillovers and additional tests, we show that audits operate via both a direct detection effect as well as through indirect deterrence channels. Politically connected firms suffer after the audits. Our estimates indicate the anti-corruption program generates significant local multipliers which are consistent with the presence of a large corruption tax on government-dependent firms.

中文翻译：

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腐败与企业

摘要

我们使用关于腐败和公司的丰富微观数据估计了随机反腐败打击对巴西地方政府的因果实际经济影响。在反腐败审计之后，市政当局发现集中在最依赖政府关系和公共采购部门的公司数量有所增加。通过对地理溢出的估计和额外的测试，我们表明审计通过直接检测效应和间接威慑渠道进行。有政治关联的公司在审计后遭受损失。我们的估计表明，反腐败计划产生了显着的本地乘数，这与对依赖政府的公司征收高额腐败税是一致的。