We examine the impact of creditor control rights on corporate acquisitions. Nearly 75% of loan agreements include restrictions that limit borrower acquisition decisions throughout the life of the contract. Following a financial covenant violation, creditors use their bargaining power to tighten these restrictions and limit acquisition activity, particularly deals expected to earn negative announcement returns. Firms that do announce an acquisition after violating a financial covenant earn 1.8% higher stock returns, on average, and do not pursue less risky deals. We conclude that creditors use contractual rights and the renegotiation process to limit value-destroying acquisitions driven by managerial agency problems.

中文翻译：

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公司收购的债权人控制

我们研究了债权人控制权对公司收购的影响。近 75% 的贷款协议包括在整个合同有效期内限制借款人购买决策的限制。在违反财务契约之后，债权人利用他们的议价能力来收紧这些限制并限制收购活动，特别是预计会获得负公告回报的交易。在违反财务契约后宣布收购的公司平均可获得高 1.8% 的股票回报，并且不会追求风险较低的交易。我们得出结论，债权人使用合同权利和重新谈判过程来限制由管理代理问题驱动的破坏价值的收购。