Abstract

We study the relationship between the presence of politicians on mobile service operators’ boards and the regulation of the mobile telecommunication sector. In countries in which mobile operators have deeper connections with local politicians, we find that rules promote competition less, even after we control for country fixed effects and a country’s level of corruption. Rules that promote competition are associated with lower concentration and lower prices. There is no evidence that procompetition rules are associated with worse quality, lower investments, less employment, or lower wages. Thus, all the evidence points to political connections being a form of rent-seeking.

中文翻译：

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移动通信行业竞争的政治决定因素

摘要

我们研究了移动服务运营商董事会中政治家的存在与移动电信部门的监管之间的关系。在移动运营商与当地政治家有更深联系的国家，我们发现规则对竞争的促进作用较小，即使我们控制了国家固定效应和国家的腐败程度。促进竞争的规则与较低的集中度和较低的价格有关。没有证据表明促进竞争规则与较差的质量、较低的投资、较少的就业或较低的工资有关。因此，所有证据都表明政治关系是一种寻租形式。