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Merleau-Ponty, Trans Philosophy, and the Ambiguous Body
Human Studies ( IF 0.431 ) Pub Date : 2021-06-30 , DOI: 10.1007/s10746-021-09590-7
Seth Daves

In this paper, I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s seminal book, Phenomenology of Perception, stands as a positive resource for articulating both trans experiences and trans identities within both a wrong-body model and a multiple worlds of sense model of trans philosophy. I begin my paper by highlighting the complex relation between Talia Bettcher’s proposed multiple worlds of sense model and the wrong-body model. As the dismissal of either model appears undesirable, I suggest that we attempt to combine the two models. To do this, I turn to Georgia Warnke’s contextual understanding of identity as I ultimately juxtapose her work with Merleau-Ponty in order to give a positive account of trans identities that will function as a bridge between Merleau-Ponty and Bettcher. I then turn to discuss the basic ideas within Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception that are used to ground Rubin’s wrong-body model. As I contend that Merleau-Ponty has more to offer what Rubin attributes to him, I then turn to key passages concerning Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the sexual schema and the intrinsic ambiguity of the body. By incorporating both concepts into a discussion of trans philosophy, I argue that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology offers a non-essentialist account of sexuality that both phenomenologically legitimates and grounds the wide spectrum of trans experiences and trans identities as well as Warnke’s contextual identity through, what I call, our ambiguous-being-in-the-world. Such an account, I conclude, makes possible a combined wrong-body model and multiple worlds of sense model of trans philosophy.



中文翻译:

梅洛-庞蒂、跨性别哲学和模棱两可的身体

在这篇论文中,我认为梅洛-庞蒂的开创性著作《知觉现象学》,作为一种积极的资源,可以在错误的身体模型和跨性别哲学的多感官世界模型中阐明跨性别体验和跨性别身份。我的论文首先强调了 Talia Bettcher 提出的多重感官世界模型与错误身体模型之间的复杂关系。由于驳回任何一种模式似乎都是不可取的,我建议我们尝试将两种模式结合起来。为此,我转向乔治亚·沃恩克 (Georgia Warnke) 对身份的上下文理解,因为我最终将她与梅洛-庞蒂的作品并列在一起,以便对跨性别身份进行积极的描述,这将成为梅洛-庞蒂和贝彻之间的桥梁。然后我转而讨论梅洛-庞蒂的感知现象学中的基本思想用于验证鲁宾的错误体模型。当我认为梅洛-庞蒂有更多的东西可以提供鲁宾赋予他的东西时,我然后转向关于梅洛-庞蒂对性图式和身体内在歧义的理解的关键段落。通过将这两个概念合并到跨性别哲学的讨论中,我认为梅洛-庞蒂的现象学提供了一种非本质主义的性描述,它在现象学上合法化并为广泛的跨性别体验和跨性别身份以及 Warnke 的语境身份奠定了基础,通过什么,我称之为,我们在世间的暧昧存在。我的结论是,这样的解释使跨性别哲学的错误身体模型和多感官世界模型相结合成为可能。

更新日期:2021-06-30
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