In moral psychology, “psychological rationalism” is the view that moral judgments are caused by a process of reasoning. Jonathan Haidt argues against this view by showing that people succumb to “moral dumbfounding”—they cannot adequately provide reasoning for their moral judgment. I argue that this evidence undermines psychological rationalism only if the view is committed to two claims about reasoning: (a) reasoning must meet an adequacy condition, and (b) reasoning must be sufficiently conscious. I argue that plausible variants of psychological rationalism are not committed to these requirements. Thus, the efficacy of the dumbfounding objection is more limited than it might initially seem.

中文翻译：

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道德愚昧的限度

在道德心理学中，“心理理性主义”认为道德判断是由推理过程引起的。乔纳森·海特 (Jonathan Haidt) 反对这种观点，他表明人们会屈服于“道德上的傻眼”——他们无法为自己的道德判断提供充分的推理。我认为，只有当观点致力于关于推理的两个主张时，这个证据才会破坏心理理性主义：（a）推理必须满足充分条件，（b）推理必须有足够的意识。我认为心理理性主义的合理变体并不符合这些要求。因此，令人瞠目结舌的反对意见的效力比它最初看起来的要有限。