We examine whether state ownership affects the effectiveness of macroprudential policies in curbing bank credit growth. Using a panel data set of 386 banks from 50 countries around the world over the period 2001–2013, we find that macroprudential policies limit credit growth; however, the coefficient of the interaction between state ownership and macroprudential indices is positive and statistically significant. This finding suggests that bank state ownership weakens the effectiveness of macroprudential policies in reducing credit growth. This result is robust to controls for bank- and country-level variables and endogeneity concerns. Nonetheless, we report that the type of macroprudential policies, the type of bank loans, and other country-level characteristics, such as the extent of political connections and corruption in bank lending, can influence the joint role of state ownership and macroprudential policies.

我们研究了国有所有权是否会影响宏观审慎政策在抑制银行信贷增长方面的有效性。使用 386 的面板数据集 2001 年至 2013 年期间全球 50 个国家的银行，我们发现宏观审慎政策限制了信贷增长；然而，国家所有权与宏观审慎指数之间的相互作用系数为正且具有统计显着性。这一发现表明，银行国有制削弱了宏观审慎政策在降低信贷增长方面的有效性。这一结果对于控制银行和国家层面的变量以及内生性问题是稳健的。尽管如此，我们报告说，宏观审慎政策的类型、银行贷款的类型以及其他国家层面的特征，例如政治联系的程度和银行贷款的腐败程度，都会影响国有所有权和宏观审慎政策的共同作用。