The present paper studies a supply chain model with items that are of imperfect quality and with the assumption that end demand is responsive to price and promotion cost. The seller delivers items to the buyer in a lot. After an inspection process, it is observed that few articles produced are not of perfect quality. These defects might be the result of common operations or static maintenance. These defective items are then collected and are sold at a lower/discounted price. In this paper, supply chain models are developed to approve the interaction among the players, in the supply chain channel. This interaction between the players is demonstrated by non-cooperative and cooperative game theoretical approaches. In non-cooperative approach, optimal solutions are attained by game theoretic approaches named as Seller–Stackelberg and Buyer–Stackelberg. In the cooperative approach, a Pareto efficient solution is outlined. In the last, numerical illustrations with sensitivity scrutiny are presented to support the theory of the present paper.

本论文研究了一个供应链模型，其中包含质量不完善的项目，并假设最终需求对价格和促销成本有反应。卖方将物品分批交付给买方。经过检查过程后，发现很少有产品质量不完美。这些缺陷可能是常见操作或静态维护的结果。然后收集这些有缺陷的物品并以较低/折扣价出售。在本文中，开发了供应链模型以批准供应链渠道中参与者之间的交互。非合作和合作博弈理论方法证明了玩家之间的这种互动。在非合作方法中，最优解是通过名为 Seller-Stackelberg 和 Buyer-Stackelberg 的博弈论方法获得的。在合作方法中，概述了帕累托有效的解决方案。最后，提供了具有敏感性审查的数值说明来支持本文的理论。